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WHAT DID PUNITIVE DAMAGES DO? WHY 
MISUNDERSTANDING THE HISTORY OF PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES MATTERS TODAY 
ANTHONY J. SEBOK* 
INTRODUCTION 
Punitive damages occupy a unique place in Anglo-American law. 
They require juries to measure damages based on the defendant's 
attitude when he injured the plaintiff, and they allow juries tremen-
dous discretion in doing so. Most recent debate over punitive dam-
ages has focused on the frequency and scale of damages awarded by 
juries. 1 Some have questioned whether juries are capable of following 
the instructions that they receive.2 The more basic question-what 
are the purposes or rationales for punitive damages-has not played 
as great a role as one might think. This is because, as commentators 
have pointed out, punitive damages are explained by courts and 
commentators as having a variety of plausible purposes, some mutu-
ally complementary and some mutually exclusive.3 
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank Ningur Akoglu, BLS 
'04 and Vijay Baliga, BLS '04, for their invaluable research assistance, as well as John Goldberg, 
Catherine Sharkey, and Lisa White for their comments and suggestions. This Article was 
written with the support of a Summer Research Grant from Brooklyn Law School. 
1. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al. , Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An 
Empirical Study , 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002); Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of 
Justice Through National Punitive Damages Reform, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1573 (1997); Dan 
Quayle, Civil Justice Reform , 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559 (1992); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in 
Punitive Damages "Run Wild": Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1003 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein et al. , Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition 
and Valuation in Law) , 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998). 
2. See, e.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can 't Do Well: The Jury 's 
Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998); David A. Schkade et al., 
Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000), W. Kip 
Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (2001). 
3. A typical commentary on modern punitive damages doctrine points out that 
[a)lthough most courts refer only to "punishment" and "deterrence" as rationales for 
[punitive] damages, this masks the variety of specific functions that punitive damages 
actually serve. The functions of punitive damages can be divided and subdivided in 
any number of overlapping ways, but the following division should prove useful for the 
particular points examined here: (1) education, (2) retribution, (3) deterrence, (4) 
compensation, and (5) law enforcement. 
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It is worth taking note, therefore, when the United States Su-
preme Court actually bases a decision on the grounds that, of the 
many possible functions of punitive damages, one is more salient than 
another. That is what the Court did in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. 4 In Cooper, the Court used a claim 
about the contrast between the historical and contemporary functions 
of punitive damages to justify its conclusion that jury awards of 
punitive damages today are punishment, not compensation.5 In turn, 
the Court used this historical contrast to conclude that jury determi-
nations of punitive damages are not today "findings of facts," al-
though, presumably, they once were.6 The Court therefore concluded 
that punitive damage verdicts by juries were not within the Seventh 
Amendment's Reexamination Clause and, as matters of law, ought to 
be reviewed on appeal under a de novo standard.7 
In this Article I will not take issue with the wisdom of the Court's 
holding. I will instead criticize the historical and functional argu-
ments used by the Court to reach its holding. In Part I, I will examine 
the grounds offered by the Court for its holding in Cooper. I will 
show that the Court justified its functional approach to the review of 
punitive damages partly on the grounds that the function of punitive 
damages has changed since the nineteenth century. In Part II, I will 
show that early punitive damage awards did not compensate for 
losses that today would be recognized as part of the blackletter 
categories of compensatory damages, and so it would be at best 
anachronistic ( and at worst misleading) to say that punitive damages 
served primarily a compensatory function in the early years of 
American tort law, as the Court claimed in Cooper. In Part III, I will 
show that punitive damages served a range of functions, including 
vindication and redress for insult, which the Court's either/or choice 
between compensation and punishment missed and cannot explain. I 
David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. 
REV. 363, 373-74 (1994) (citations omitted). Another commentator suggests seven: 
(1) punishing the defendant; (2) deterring the defendant from repeating the offense; 
(3) deterring others from committing an offense; (4) preserving the peace; (5) inducing 
private law enforcement; (6) compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable 
losses; and (7) paying the plaintiffs attorney's fees. 
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr. , Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1982). 
4. 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001). 
5. Id. at 1683, 1686 n.11. 
6. Id. at 1686. 
7. Id. at 1685-86. 
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conclude this Article by suggesting that Cooper was a step back for 
those who wish to bring principled adjudication into modem punitive 
damages. 
The point of the Article is not to chide the Court for making a 
mistake about legal history. As will become apparent as the argu-
ment unfolds, the real story of what punitive damages were supposed 
to do in the nineteenth century is complex and rich with possibilities 
that could inform contemporary analysis. The crude revisionist 
model imposed by the Court not only weakens its argument that 
juries exercise moral judgment when determining punitive damages, 
it makes it harder to explain what the content of that moral judgment 
is, and how it should be presented to juries. In fact, as I suggest in my 
conclusion, the Court's historical errors will probably have the 
unintended consequence of strengthening the already popular views 
that punitive damages are simply one way that society deters bad 
conduct and that punitive damage awards should be calculated 
according to the logic of efficient deterrence. 
I. COOPER V. LEATHERMAN AND THE HISTORICAL FuNCTION OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The Cooper case involved a suit by a tool manufacturer against 
another manufacturer.8 The defendant marketed a tool very similar 
to one already marketed by the plaintiff.9 The plaintiff sued for 
trademark infringement, arguing, among other things, that the 
defendant had gone so far as to have photographed the plaintiffs 
product and used that photograph in promotional material advertis-
ing the defendant's own product.10 A jury found for the plaintiff and 
awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 million in 
punitive damages. 11 The district court rejected the defendant's 
argument that the punitive damages were grossly excessive in viola-
tion of due process under the United States Constitution.12 On 
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the award of punitive damages based on the conclusion that 
the district court had not abused its discretion in declining to reduce 
8. Id. at 1680. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 1681. 
11. Id. 
12. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus. , Inc., 1997 US Dist LEXIS 22763 at *9 
(D. Or. Nov. 14, 1997). 
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the award.13 The Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice 
Stevens, reversed the Ninth Circuit.14 
The constitutional question raised in Cooper was under what 
standard the Ninth Circuit should have reviewed the trial court's 
judgment concerning the constitutionality of the jury's award of 
punitive damages. 15 There were two choices available to the Ninth 
Circuit. Under the de novo standard, the appellate judges look 
directly at the trial record and test the jury's award against their own 
best understanding of the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Under the abuse of discretion standard, the appellate judges examine 
the trial judge's review of the jury verdict and overturn the trial 
judge's judgment only if the trial judge's application of the Four-
teenth Amendment was clearly erroneous. 
In order to answer this question, the Court argued that de novo 
review is required because the test for whether a jury award violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment is like the test used in other cases in 
which the federal appellate courts review the application of punish-
ment by the states. 16 On the other hand, the Court rejected the 
argument that the Seventh Amendment required abuse of discretion 
review.17 The Court noted that, although the Seventh Amendment's 
Reexamination Clause had been interpreted by the Court, in earlier 
decisions, to direct the appellate courts to review trial court judg-
ments concerning jury awards under an abuse of discretion standard, 
the Seventh Amendment did not apply to punitive damage awards, 
since punitive damage awards were not findings of fact "found" by a 
jury.is 
In Cooper, therefore, there are two arguments, one positive and 
one negative. On the positive side, the Court made a case for why 
punitive damage verdicts should be reviewed under a de novo stan-
dard. On the negative side, the Court made a case for why punitive 
damages should not be reviewed under the abuse of discretion 
standard. The positive argument turned on drawing a comparison 
between punitive damages and criminal and civil penalties, and the 
negative argument turned on emphasizing the disanalogy between 
13. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 205 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1999). 
14. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1683. 
15. Id. at 1682. 
16. Id. at 1683. 
17. Id. at 1684, 1686. 
18. Id. at 1686-87. 
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punitive damages and "facts." The two arguments were not explicitly 
connected; but, as I will show, both depended on characterizing the 
determination of the size of punitive damages as a moral judgment. 
The Court's assumption was that where state law requires juries to 
make moral judgments, the Seventh Amendment no longer applies, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment requires de novo review. 
A. The Positive Argument: Punitive Damages Awards Are Value 
Judgments 
The first part of the Court's argument began with the following 
claim: "A jury's assessment of the extent of a plaintiff's injury is 
essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive 
damages is an expression of its moral condemnation. "19 The Court 
argued that, because punitive damage awards reflect moral judg-
ments, they are like criminal punishments set by legislatures.20 Of 
course in 1989, the Court held in Browning-Ferris that punitive 
damage awards were not criminal penalties and therefore could not 
be reviewed under the Eighth Amendment.21 However, both punitive 
damage awards and criminal penalties share something in common: 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the 
context of criminal law, the Eighth Amendment is imposed against 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; 
and in the context of tort law, the Due Process Clause is applied 
directly to the states. 
The Due Process Clause, said the Court, constrains the states in 
criminal law and tort law in related ways. In criminal law the states 
are prohibited from imposing excessive fines and cruel and unusual 
punishment, and in tort law they are prohibited "from imposing 
'grossly excessive' punishments on tortfeasors."22 A punitive damage 
award is grossly excessive when it bears no reasonable relationship to 
the compensatory damage that underwrites it.23 Penalties that bear 
no reasonable relationship to underlying compensatory damages 
violate due process, the court explained in Gore, because they (by 
definition) cannot be anticipated in advance, and hence violate the 
19. Id. at 1683. 
20. Id. at 1683-86. 
21. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,279 (1989). 
22. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1684 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 
(1996)). 
23. Id. at 1691. 
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basic principle that no one should be punished without prior notice of 
the penalty.24 
The Court suggested in Cooper that where it has struck down an 
entire class of punishment it is because it was "grossly excessive" in 
the same way that a tort penalty could be "grossly excessive."25 For 
example, in cases involving the death penalty, life imprisonment, or 
forfeiture, the Court has used "the same general criteria" that it 
adopted in Gore.26 Those criteria are: (1) the degree of the defen-
dant's reprehensibility or culpability; (2) the relationship between the 
penalty and the harm to the victim caused by the defendant's actions; 
and (3) the sanctions imposed in other cases for comparable miscon-
duct.27 
The Court summarized the three-part test for excessiveness un-
der the following rubric: a penalty violates the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment if it is '"grossly disproportional to the 
gravity of . . . defendants' offenses."'28 Let us call this the "grossly 
disproportionate" standard (the "GD Standard"). The Court may be 
correct that this norm regulates the limits of the states' power to 
punish, both in criminal law and tort law. This does not explain why, 
however, an appellate court should review a trial court's application 
of the GD Standard de novo. 
At one level, it is strange that one even has to pose the question. 
One might simply argue that if the application of the GD Standard is 
an interpretation of the Constitution, the judge who performs the task 
of interpretation is obliged to interpret the Constitution, and not 
defer to another judge's interpretation. But such an argument has 
never been the view of the Supreme Court and the Court did not 
invoke it in Cooper. Instead, the Court made an argument about 
24. Gore, 517 U.S. at 562, 574-75. 
25. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1684. 
26. Id. at 1684 (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998) ($357,144 
penalty excessive for reporting violation); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (life 
imprisonment excessive for nonviolent felony); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,787,801 (1982) 
(death penalty excessive for robbery leading to murder); Colker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 
(1977) (death penalty excessive for rape) and comparing these cases to Gore). 
27. Gore, 517 U.S., 575-85 
28. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1684 (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334). This explains why, for 
example, the court might hold that the death penalty is not excessive in the case of murder, or 
why a punitive damage award of $5 billion is not excessive in the case of a tort resulting in a $2 
billion loss. 
2003] WHAT DID PUNITIVE DAMAGES DO? 169 
institutional competency that was both prudential and based some-
what in the legal process tradition.29 
The Court began its justification of de novo review by observing 
that the only issue at stake was the review of the trial court's determi-
nation that a tort-based punishment was not grossly excessive accord-
ing to the Fourteenth Amendment.30 The Court's argument for de 
novo review must be read against a background in which district court 
judgments generally are treated under the abuse of discretion stan-
dard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Under Rule 59, the 
district court may order a new trial or offer a remittitur.31 When 
considering a Rule 59 motion challenging the compensatory or 
punitive damages awarded by the jury, the court must decide whether 
the award is against the weight of the evidence or excessive given 
state law. A typical common law test for excessiveness in punitive 
damages is that the award "shocks the judicial conscience" or is 
unreasonable in light of the punitive and deterrent purposes of the 
award. There might be other state statutory limits as well, although it 
is not clear whether these would properly be raised under Rule 8, 
Rule 59, or Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or 
perhaps simply imposed by the court as part of its duty under Erie.32 
29. The theory of "institutional competence" propounded by the Legal Process School held 
that "there could be a kind of natural, functional correlation between different kinds of disputes 
and different kinds of institutions, so that the categories of dispute could be matched up with 
the kinds of institutional procedures corresponding to them." Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in 
the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561 , 594 (1988). 
30. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1685. 
31. See Colleen P. Murphy, Judgment As A Matter of Law on Punitive Damages, 75 TUL. 
L. REV. 459, 462-64 (2000). 
32. This issue has arisen frequently with regard to the failure to plead statutory caps. See, 
e.g., Taylor v. United States, 821 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1987) (statutory limitation on professional 
negligence may be pied postverdict under Rules 59 and 60); Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 
1075 (5th Cir. 1987) (statutory limitation on professional negligence must be pied under Rule 8 
or waived); Jakobsen v. Mass. Port Auth., 520 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1975) (statutory limitation on 
Port Authority liability should have been pied as an affirmative defense). The Supreme Court 
has not answered this question. See Taylor v. United States, 485 U.S. 992 (1988) (White, J., 
dissenting). The most recent treatment of the question anticipated the court's comments in 
Cooper. In Westfarm Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commis-
sion, 66 F.3d 669 (4th Cir. 1995), the defendant, a municipality, moved under Rule 59 to limit its 
liability under a state law capping municipal liability at $200,000. The district court held that 
since it had not raised the cap under Rule 8 in anticipation of the judgment, it had waived the 
limitation. The Fourth Circuit noted that: 
The district court found that the cap is an affirmative defense, which therefore 
must be raised, according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) ... . The district 
court found that because the defense had not been raised or tried by the parties, it was 
waived. 
We review a district court's factual findings on a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of 
discretion, Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990), but we review 
the district court's legal holdings de nova, Taylor v. United States, 821 F.2d 1428, 1430 
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In a case arising from a Rule 59 motion, the district court's judg-
ment will be reviewed by the appellate court under an abuse of 
discretion standard.33 Therefore, when a federal trial judge has to 
determine whether a punitive damage award "shocks the judicial 
conscience" under Rule 59, her judgment is reviewed by the appellate 
court under a lower standard than when she has to determine 
whether the same award is "grossly excessive" under the Due Process 
Clause.34 The procedural basis for this disparate treatment of what 
otherwise appears to be the same question is that "gross" excessive-
ness under the Fourteenth Amendment concerns the application of 
federal constitutional law, and common law excessiveness is a matter 
of state law.35 
n.1 (9th Cir. 1987) (Taylor I), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 992, 108 S.Ct. 1300, 99 L. Ed. 2d 
510 (1988) (White, J. , dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Taylor II). 
Westfarm, 66 F.3d at 689. The court, noting the split in the circuits, then determined that it need 
not decide whether the limitation on liability should have been raised under Rule 8, because the 
answer was nonoutcome determinative. Id. at 690. 
These cases raise an interesting question: how ought a state ( or federal) statutory cap or 
ratio on punitive damages enter into a case? The court in Cooper seemed to assume that if the 
defendant wished to take advantage of a cap or statute, she ought to raise it under Rule 59. See 
Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1687 n.13. The answer has direct application to the due process issue, since 
one could argue that the Due Process Clause imposes an "upper cap" on the range of punitive 
damages that a jury may award, much like a statutory cap. See, e.g., Brief for the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America, 1999 Lexsee US Briefs 2035, *15-*16 (" the 
excessiveness inquiry under Gore and comparable state-law standards is analogous to the 
application of a statutory damages cap"). I thank Professor John Goldberg for pointing this 
argument out to me. 
33. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. , 492 U.S. 257, 279. n.18 
(1989): 
The role of the district court is to determine whether the jury's verdict is within the 
confines set by state law, and to determine, by reference to federal standards devel-
oped under Rule 59, whether a new trial or remittitur should be ordered. The court of 
appeals should then review the district court's determination under an abuse-of-
discretion standard. 
Cooper is in accord. See Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1684. 
34. Furthermore, even when confining itself to a case arising under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the court noted that the appellate court was obliged to defer to a trial judge on 
matters of fact . Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1685. 
35. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438 n.22 (1996): 
It is indeed "Hornbook" law that a most usual ground for a Rule 59 motion is that "the 
damages are excessive. " See C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 676-677 (5th ed. 1994). 
Whether damages are excessive for the claim-in-suit must be governed by some law. 
And there is no candidate for that governance other than the law that gives rise to the 
claim for relief-here, the law of New York. See ... Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S., at 279 
("standard of excessiveness" is a "matte[r] of state, and not federal , common law"). 
Since Cooper was handed down, a majority of states courts have used the de novo standard 
to review a trial court's review of the constitutionality of an award of punitive damages and the 
abuse of discretion standard to review the trial court's review of a punitive damage award under 
the state 's common law excessiveness standard. See Cent. Bering Sea Fisherman's Ass 'n. v. 
Anderson, 54 P.3d 271, 277 (Alaska 2002); Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 165 
(Ca. Ct. App. 2002); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Six Flags Over Ga., 563 S.E.2d 178, 183 (Ga. 
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But what rationale is there for the difference? The Court's ex-
planation did not directly address that gap.36 Instead, it focused on 
the unique features of a constitutional norm like the GD Standard. 
What are those features? The Court noted that the question of 
whether a punishment is proportionate is like the question of whether 
a police officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause.37 In both 
cases, the norm cannot be articulated except through application to 
the facts of the case. There are three reasons for this. First, gross 
excess in punishment is a '"fluid concept that takes [its] substantive 
content"' from the context in which it is being assessed.38 Second, a 
standard like gross excess takes its "content" not only from context 
but "'only through application."'39 Third, de novo review of such a 
constitutional standard "'tends to unify precedent and stabilize the 
law."'40 This argument takes one of the primary practical features of 
the GD Standard-that in order for a punishment to be fair, it must 
be comparable to other punishments awarded for similar wrongs, and 
that comparability must be knowable in advance-and marries it to a 
claim of comparative institutional competency-that the appellate 
courts are in the best position to engage in broad comparisons across 
the federal system. It roots the argument for de novo review of 
judgments about the Due Process Clause in pragmatic concerns. 
But there is still a nagging question: if the right way to apply the 
GD Standard to jury verdicts is de novo review (for the reasons 
described in the previous paragraph), why not insist on de novo 
review when appellate courts review district court judgments under 
Rule 59? Everything that the Court argued concerning the pragmatic 
advantages of de novo review when inquiring into the gross excess of 
a penalty could be argued about the inquiry into whether a penalty is 
so excessive that it shocks the judicial conscience. As Justice Gins-
burg put it in her dissent, the Court's opinion now "requires lower 
Ct. App. 2002); Stroud v. Lints, 760 N.E.2d 1176, 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Mosing v. Domas, 
830 So. 2d 967, 970 (La. 2002); Baker v. Nat') State Bank, 801 A.2d 1158, 1162-63 (N.J. Super 
Ct. App. Div. 2002); Leisinger v. Jacobson, 651 N.W.2d 693, 696 n.2 (S.D. 2002). But see 
Diversified Holdings L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129 'I 4 (holding that de novo review should be 
used for review under federal and state standards). 
36. The Court states simply that "(i]f no constitutional issue is raised, the role of the 
appellate court, at least in the federal system, is merely to review the trial court's 'determination 
under an abuse-of-discretion standard."' Cooper, 121 S. Ct. 1684. 
37. Id. at 1685 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996)). 
38. Id. (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696). 
39. Id. (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697). 
40. Id. (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697-98). 
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courts to distinguish between ordinary common law excessiveness and 
constitutional excessiveness."41 The point is not that the Court's 
argument for de novo review is unpersuasive, given the premise that 
punitive damages are punishment. The point is that it proves too 
much: if de novo review is such a good idea, why isn't it required for 
all federal appellate review of the excessiveness of punitive dam-
ages?42 
There is no way to answer this question without bringing in the 
Seventh Amendment, which is the missing piece in the Cooper story. 
The question of whether a punitive damage award is excessive under 
state law is a question of fact, and the Seventh Amendment severely 
restricts a reexamination of any finding of fact by the federal courts.43 
In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,44 the Court held that 
appellate review of a federal trial court's refusal to set aside a jury 
verdict as excessive is reconcilable with the Seventh Amendment if 
"appellate control [is] limited to review for 'abuse of discretion."' 
Cooper was not supposed to modify Gasperini, which placed all Rule 
59 review under the protection of the Seventh Amendment: 
We agree with the Second Circuit, however, that "[f]or purposes of 
deciding whether state or federal law is applicable [ under the Sev-
enth Amendment], the question whether an award of compensatory 
damages exceeds what is permitted by law is not materially differ-
41. Id. at 1693. 
42. In this context it is useful to recall Justice Kennedy's early plea for uniform standards if 
the Supreme Court was to engage in substantive due process review of punitive damages: 
To ask whether a particular award of punitive damages is grossly excessive begs the 
question: excessive in relation to what? The answer excessive in relation to the con-
duct of the tortfeasor may be correct, but it is unhelpful, for we are still bereft of any 
standard by which to compare the punishment to the malefaction that gave rise to it. 
A reviewing court employing this formulation comes close to relying upon nothing 
more than its own subjective reaction to a particular punitive damages award in decid-
ing whether the award violates the Constitution. This type of review, far from impos-
ing meaningful, law-like restraints on jury excess, could become as fickle as the process 
it is designed to superintend. 
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 466-67 (1993) (Kennedy, J. , concurring). 
The problem is, what Justice Kennedy argues about due process is, in theory, no Jess true about 
remittitur. 
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (" In Suits at common Jaw, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a 
jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law."). · 
44. 518 U.S. 415,419 (1996); see also Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208, 211-12 
(1998) (per curiam) (Court reaffirming that the Seventh Amendment does not permit the 
outright reduction of an excessive jury award (citing Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 433)). 
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ent from the question whether an award of punitive damages ex-
ceeds what is permitted by law."45 
173 
The short answer as to why excessiveness under state law cannot be 
treated like excessiveness under the Constitution is not that the 
standards might be different (they may not be) or that de novo review 
of Rule 59 judgments might not benefit from "interpretation through 
application" (it might). The reason is that the Seventh Amendment 
will not permit it. 
The Court recognized that, until its decision in Cooper, many ob-
servers thought that the Seventh Amendment applied to cases like 
Haslip and Gore and that federal trial courts were engaged in the 
same sort of project when they reviewed punitive damages under 
Rule 59 and then the Fourteenth Amendment. In Cooper the Court 
set the record straight: 
Because the jury's award of punitive damages does not constitute a 
finding of "fact," appellate review of the District Court's determi-
nation that an award is consistent with due process does not impli-
cate the Seventh Amendment concerns raised by respondent .... 
Our decisions in Gasperini and Hetzel, both of which concerned 
compensatory damages, are not to the contrary.46 
It is true that both Gasperini and Hetzel raised questions about 
the excessiveness of compensatory damages under Rule 59 only. So it 
remained a logical possibility that, if punitive damage awards were 
not facts when viewed from the perspective of due process, and the 
Seventh Amendment requires that appellate courts use an abuse of 
discretion test when they review district court judgments relating to 
facts, then appellate review of whether a punitive damage award 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment would not be governed by the 
Seventh Amendment. The Court seized this logical possibility, and 
thereby provided an answer to critics (such as Justice Ginsberg in 
dissent) who would otherwise have demanded an explanation as to 
why the Court had, until now, treated punitive damages very differ-
ently from criminal punishment imposed by the state.47 But, of 
45. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 435 (alteration in original) (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong 
World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1012 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
46. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1686. 
47. And what about appellate review of whether a punitive damage award is excessive 
under state law? The Court did not answer this question (it was not before it), but hinted at a 
solution: if the state treats the question of excessiveness as a matter of fact-as indicated, 
perhaps, by its adoption of the term "remittitur"-then the federal court should treat the 
punitive damage award as a factual finding for purposes of Rule 59. I admit that this is a 
speculative claim. It is based on note 10 of the majority opinion: 
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course, to make this argument stick, the Court had to explicitly 
state-and justify-the somewhat novel view that when juries as-
sessed punitive damages, they were not engaged in fact-finding. 
B. The Negative Argument: Punitive Damage Calculations by Juries 
Are Not "Seventh Amendment" Facts. 
The positive component of the Court's argument was that puni-
tive damages are punishment imposed by the state, and, as punish-
ment imposed by the state, ought to be treated like other state-
imposed punishment in questions of due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment. The argument for this was partially one of 
family resemblance (both criminal penalties and tort penalties are 
tested under the GD Standard) and one of pragmatism (the GD 
Standard works best when appellate courts review trial court applica-
tions of it de novo ). The negative component of the Court's argu-
ment was that punitive damage awards are not findings of fact. That 
argument was raised in order to disable the Seventh Amendment 
argument. 
The first component of the Court's argument posited that puni-
tive damages are more similar to penalties in criminal law than tort 
awards, which are based on "concrete" fact. 48 The second component 
posited that punitive damages judgments are more similar to findings 
of law than findings of fact. 49 The decision as a whole relied on two 
contrasts: (1) factual loss vs. punishment and (2) findings of fact vs. 
legal findings. Placed alongside one another, it is obvious that the 
idea of a "fact" is doing different sorts of work in each contrast. In the 
former, damages based on "fact" are awarded in order to replace the 
things the private litigant has lost, and damages that "punish" are 
Respondent argues that our decision in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg . .. rests upon the 
assumption that punitive damages awards are findings of fact. In that case, we held 
that the Oregon Constitution, which prohibits the reexamination of any "fact tried by a 
jury," ... violated due process because it did not allow for any review of the constitu-
tionality of punitive damages awards. Respondent claims that, because we considered 
this provision of the Oregon Constitution to cover punitive damages, we implicitly held 
that punitive damages are a "fact tried by a jury" . . . . It was the Oregon Supreme 
Court's interpretation of that provision, however, and not our own, that compelled the 
treatment of punitive damages as covered. 
Id. at 1686 n.10 (citations omitted). 
48. Id. at 1683. What is a concrete fact? A fact '" which presents a question of historical or 
predictive fact, see, e.g. , [St. Louis, J.M. & S.R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 35 S.Ct. 704, 59 L.Ed. 
1160 (1915)], the level of punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury.'" Cooper, 121 
S. Ct. at 1686 (quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 459 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
49. Id. at 1683-84. 
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awarded to promote public policy. In the latter, conclusions that are 
within a layperson's competency are deemed factual while conclu-
sions requiring the skills of the court are deemed legal. 
The Court seemed to be assuming that there is a common ele-
ment in the factual nature of private redress and the special range of 
jury decisionmaking protected under the Seventh Amendment. What 
is the common element? It seems that the Court's answer is that, like 
the calculation of compensation, the determination of a fact by a jury 
does not employ moral concepts or reasoning. As the Court said in 
setting out the first contrast, "a jury's assessment of the extent of a 
plaintiff's injury is essentially a factual determination, whereas its 
imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral condem-
nation. "50 Later, when pressed to explain why, despite the fact that 
they are awarded by juries, punitive damages are not facts found by 
juries, the court again invoked morality as the contrast to fact. 51 In 
fact, the Court's insistence on drawing as sharp a distinction between 
jury fact-finding and jury moralizing was so strong that it downplayed 
the vast (and widely accepted) literature that stresses punitive dam-
ages' deterrent function,52 since even admitting that juries might be 
trying to base their awards on factual determinations such as the costs 
and benefits of defendants' wrongdoing would bring their decision-
making too close to the Seventh Amendment. Instead, the Court 
made a passing reference to various theories of punishment that are 
not deterrence-based.53 
To be clear, let me stress that the purpose of this section is not to 
criticize the Court's holding. I am very attracted to the idea that 
punitive damages are primarily about moral judgment. And it seems 
to me for a variety of reasons that appellate review of trial court 
judgments pertaining to the constitutionality of a jury's punitive 
damages award ought to be de novo. The purpose of this section is to 
criticize the reasoning used by the Court that brought it to its salutary 
50. Id. at 1683 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. , 418 U.S. 323,350 (1974)). 
51. Id. at1686-87. 
52. "Deterrence is probably the most universal rationale [of punitive damages]." David F. 
Partlett, Punitive Damages: Legal Hot Zones, 56 LA. L. REV. 781, 795 (1996) (citing many 
sources, among them, Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How 
Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143 (1989) and Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" 
Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831 (1989)). 
53. See Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1687 (citing Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: 
Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1436, 1449-50 (1993) (arguing 
that punitive damages are a form of "expressive defeat" of conduct juries find "morally 
offensive")). 
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conclusions. The Court's two arguments, which were detailed above, 
relied on a single common claim-that whatever juries are doing 
when they award punitive damages they are not engaging in fact-
finding because when they calculate a punitive damages award they 
are engaged in a moral enterprise. 
The Court could have reached its holding without drawing a 
stark contrast between fact-finding and moral judgment.54 The Court 
left open the possibility that the special protection extended by the 
Seventh Amendment to jury verdicts is triggered not by the verdict's 
function (to compensate) or its method Gudgment without moral 
reasoning), but by the relative absence of legal standards controlling 
the calculation of the damages, compensatory or otherwise. Under 
this argument, what distinguishes punitive damages from compensa-
tory damages is not that juries make moral judgments in the former 
and factual judgments in the latter, but that the calculation of the 
quantum of compensatory damages is not typically controlled by 
either statute or constitutional text. Were it to be the case that it 
were (for example, in the case of a statutory damage cap), then the 
jury's determination - to the extent that it related to the satisfaction 
of that legal requirement-would be viewed as a matter of law, not 
fact, and an appellate court's review of the trial court's treatment of 
the damage cap would be under a de novo, not an abuse of discretion, 
standard.55 The Court did not argue, however, that whether a dam-
54. I thank Professor John Goldberg for pointing out this argument to me. 
55. This interpretation of the Court's reasoning for its holding in Cooper, albeit attractive, 
would require further elaboration that the Court does not offer. For example, if the distinction 
between compensatory damages and punitive damages from the perspective of the Seventh 
Amendment is not their function but the degree to which each are constrained by legal 
standards, why does the Court leave open the question of whether a treble damage rule would 
be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard? 
We express no opinion on the question whether Gasperini would govern-and de novo 
review would be inappropriate-if a State were to adopt a scheme that tied the award 
of punitive damages more tightly to the jury's finding of compensatory damages. This 
might be the case, for example, if the State's scheme constrained a jury to award only 
the exact amount of punitive damages it determined were necessary to obtain eco-
nomically optimal deterrence or if it defined punitive damages as a multiple of com-
pensatory damages (e.g. , treble damages). 
Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1687 n.13; see also supra note 32. Second, assuming that the Court's view is 
that whenever a jury operates within a legally imposed damages computation rule, de novo 
review is required, why is the due process limit of "gross excessiveness" an example of a legal 
standard whereas the common law limit of "excessiveness" is not? Finally, assuming that the 
Court were to provide a satisfactory answer to these questions (by declaring that the application 
of state damage caps and common law excessiveness review should not be raised under Rule 
59), the Court would still have had to explain why, as a historical matter, the Court had not 
previously characterized the constitutional limitation of due process as a legal constraint on the 
computation of punitive damages similar to a cap or a ratio. Its answer to this question would 
seem to be that, until Gore, the constitutional due process limit on the computation of punitive 
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ages calculation by a jury counts as '"fact ' within the meaning of the 
Seventh Amendment's Reexamination Clause"56 depended on the 
existence of a precise legal rule or constitutional standard under 
which it could be reviewed. Rather, what it argued in Cooper was 
that whether a damages calculation by a jury counts as '"fact' within 
the meaning of the Seventh Amendment's Reexamination Clause" 
depended on whether the jury was compensating or punishing. The 
former argument, had it been made by the Court, would have put it 
on a very different path than the one it pursued. 
The problem with an argument that views the jury's tasks of 
compensating and punishing as mutually exclusive activities is that it 
explains a distinction that did not seem to be in need of explanation. 
Until Cooper, the most typical response to the question "why is the 
right to a jury protected under the first clause of the Seventh 
Amendment?" would have been answered by reference to the second 
clause of the Seventh Amendment-because it is the unique province 
of the jury to find facts. As the Court said in Dimick v. Schiedt, "[t]he 
controlling distinction between the power of the court and that of the 
jury is that the former is the power to determine the law and the latter 
to determine the facts. "57 Since the Seventh Amendment guaranteed 
that both compensatory and punitive damages would be determined 
by a jury, and the Seventh Amendment protected all findings of fact 
in part by requiring appellate courts to review trial courts' judgments 
deferentially, it seemed obvious that the Seventh Amendment would 
protect punitive damage judgments as jealously as compensatory 
awards. That was what Justice Ginsburg concluded when she equated 
Gasperini (in which the jury's compensatory award was reviewed by 
the appellate court for excessiveness under an abuse of discretion 
standard) with Browning-Ferris (in which the jury's punitive damage 
award was reviewed for excessiveness under an abuse of discretion 
standard).58 The Court 's answer was that none of these cases pre-
sented the exact problem raised in Cooper. 
damages was not precise enough to function as a legal constraint. This answer has the virtue of 
honesty, in that it suggests that Gore changed the constitutional sta tus of punitive damage 
calculations by juries, but it does not say why. If the Court's answer is that because punitive 
damages were once primarily about compensation and today they are about punishment (as the 
first paragraph of note eleven seems to suggest), then it falls back into relying upon a historical 
argument, which, as I show, is unsustainable. If the argument is based on another ground, the 
Court has an obligation to develop it. 
56. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1686 n. 11. 
57. 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935). 
58. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1690. 
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This response, while technically correct (in Browning-Ferris the 
real debate was over whether the Eighth Amendment would apply to 
punitive damage judgments and the excessiveness inquiry was con-
ducted under Rule 59),59 misses the point. Until Cooper, the Court 
had never suggested that punitive damage judgments were not based 
on the same competency-the ability to judge fact-as compensatory 
judgments. If anything, the reporters were filled with decisions that 
suggested otherwise. For example, in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures 
Television, Inc. (which concerned the right to a jury trial for actual 
damages), the Court illustrated its holding that "[t]he right to a jury 
trial includes the right to have a jury determine the amount of statu-
tory damages" by reference to a litany of classic eighteenth-century 
cases in which punitive damages were awarded.6() The reason the 
Feltner Court focused on cases involving punitive damages was that it 
wanted to emphasize the critical role the jury played in cases where 
damages were uncertain: "'the common law rule as it existed at the 
time of the adoption of the Constitution' was that 'in cases where the 
amount of damages was uncertain[,] their assessment was a matter so 
peculiarly within the province of the jury that the Court should not 
alter it."'6 1 According to the Feltner Court, uncertainty was a feature 
inherent in compensatory as well as punitive damages, and it was the 
jury's special competency with facts that gave it the prerogative 
enshrined in the Seventh Amendment.62 
The Court was aware of the fact that history, while not directly 
contradicting its holding in Cooper, is in tension with the story it 
wants to tell about punitive damages. A lot turns on the claim that, 
although unnoticed and unacknowledged, punitive damage judgments 
by juries are not matters of fact in the way that the Seventh Amend-
ment means fact. Why had this not been noticed until now, given the 
near conflation of compensatory and punitive damages in so much 
59. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U .S. 257, 263-75, 279-80 (1989). 
60. 523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998) (citing Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791); Wilkes v. 
Wood, Lofft 1, 19, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 499 (C. P. 1763); Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. 
Rep. 768 (C. P. 1763); Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C. L. 6, 7 (1784)). 
61. Id. at 353 (alteration in original) (quoting Dimick , 293 U.S. at 480). 
62. It is worth recalling Justice Ginsburg's observation that: 
Punitive damages are thus not " [u]nlike the measure of actual damages suffered," in 
cases of intangible, noneconomic injury. One million dollars' worth of pain and suffer-
ing does not exist as a "fact" in the world any more or less than one million dollars' 
worth of moral outrage. Both derive their meaning from a set of underlying facts as 
determined by a jury. If one exercise in quantification is properly regarded as fact-
finding ... it seems to me the other should be so regarded as well. 
Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 446 (citations omitted). 
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Seventh Amendment jurisprudence? The Court's answer was that 
punitive damages themselves had changed; until the twentieth cen-
tury punitive damages were matters of fact because they served to 
compensate, not punish. The explanation, which comes late in the 
decision, is placed in footnote eleven of the decision. It is so impor-
tant to the Court's overall argument that it is reproduced below: 
Nor does the historical material upon which respondent relies so 
extensively ... conflict with our decision to require de novo review. 
Most of the sources respondent cites merely stand for the proposi-
tion that, perhaps because it is a fact-sensitive undertaking, deter-
mining the amount of punitive damages should be left to the 
discretion of the jury ... . 
In any event, punitive damages have evolved somewhat since the 
time of respondent's sources. Until well into the 19th century, puni-
tive damages frequently operated to compensate for intangible in-
juries, compensation which was not otherwise available under the 
narrow conception of compensatory damages prevalent at the time. 
See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 61 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting); see also 
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 
517, 520 (1957) ( observing a "vacillation" in the 19th-century cases 
between "compensatory" and "punitive" theories of "exemplary 
damages"). As the types of compensatory damages available to 
plaintiffs have broadened ... the theory behind punitive damages 
has shifted towards a more purely punitive (and therefore less fac-
tual) understanding. Cf. Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev., at 520 (noting a 
historical shift away from a compensatory-and towards a more 
purely punitive-conception of punitive damages).63 
The Court was not saying, I think, that the Seventh Amend-
ment's Reexamination Clause once covered punitive damages and 
stopped at some point (perhaps around 1900).64 I think its argument 
was simply that, to the extent that the constitutional dimension of a 
punitive damage award is triggered by punitive damages when 
awarded in order to punish, deter, or express moral condemnation, 
punitive damage judgments by juries in the nineteenth century raised 
relatively few constitutional concerns since the vast bulk of those 
judgments were designed to compensate plaintiffs for intangible 
harms such as pain and suffering. If this were true, then the failure of 
the Court or others to have seen that an appellate court could not 
review a trial court's judgment about the excessiveness of punitive 
63. Id. at 1686 n.11 (some citations omitted). 
64. Although if the court was making this argument, it would be an interesting application 
of Lessig's "Erie Effect" theory of legal translation. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Transla-
tion, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity 
and Theory , 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995). 
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damages in the same way would have been understandable, and 
would explain why so many lawyers still hold the confused idea that 
punitive damage verdicts should be treated under the Due Process 
Clause like judgments relating to concrete losses. 
The Court's historical account about the two different functions 
of punitive damages in 1850 versus 1950 is an important part of its 
overall argument, because without it, the Court would have been in 
the awkward position of having created a distinction-jury judgments 
that "are about facts" versus jury judgments that are "about moral-
ity" - that solves a problem that one might think the Court invented. 
Nonetheless the Court still needed to explain why it chose to treat 
jury judgments that are labeled "punitive damages that violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment" differently from every other type of jury 
judgment-including some that are excessive only under common law 
standards. The Court's answer, underwritten by footnote eleven, was, 
in essence, that punitive damages are now more frequently about 
morality than before, and that juries, although asked to do the job, 
are not as competent at moral judgment as they were ( and are) at 
judging facts ( even facts relating to the value of pain and suffering, 
reputation, or dignity). 
II. PAIN, DISTRESS, AND INSULT: THE MANY MEANINGS OF 
COMPENSATION 
The only problem with footnote eleven is that it is wrong. The 
idea that punitive damages once performed a compensatory function 
was based on two arguments, one historical and the other doctrinal. 
The historical argument looked to the statements found in 
nineteenth-century opinions and treatises that say that the reason 
punitive damages were awarded in tort cases was to compensate for 
intangible injuries such as humiliation, sense of insult, and other 
forms of mental anguish. The doctrinal argument compared the set of 
compensatory damages available to a typical plaintiff in the nine-
teenth century to the expanded set available to a plaintiff today. It 
notes that the intangible injuries punitive damages addressed in the 
nineteenth century are compensable under contemporary categories 
of personal injury, such as emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of 
life, and the like. The doctrinal argument concludes that, since 
punitive damages are no longer needed to do what they once did, 
they must be awarded for something else-punishment and deter-
rence. 
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The doctrinal argument depends on the historical argument, and 
the historical argument stands or falls on the strength of the evidence 
that punitive damages were awarded in the nineteenth century to 
compensate for pain and suffering damages. What is the evidence? 
The Court in Cooper relied heavily on two sources for its claim. 
The first was Justice O'Connor's dissent in Haslip, where she stated 
that punitive damages were awarded to fill a "gap" created by the fact 
that in the past, "compensatory damages were not available for pain, 
humiliation and other forms of intangible injury."65 The second was a 
student note published in the Harvard Law Review in 1951.66 It 
should be noted that in Haslip, Justice O'Connor relied (again) on the 
1951 Harvard Law Review note and Redden's Punitive Damages, a 
leading treatise.67 
The Harvard note and the Redden treatise tell a story in which 
punitive damages were clearly awarded as compensation for 
"wounded feelings" in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
a situation that was necessitated by the unavailability of noneconomic 
compensatory damages.68 The author of the Harvard note com-
mented that during this time, the Illinois courts "restricted 'actual 
damages' to out-of-pocket pecuniary loss and did not include intangi-
ble harm. "69 Yet both the Harvard note and Redden describe the 
law's attitude towards punitive damages as one of "confusion" 
between compensation and punishment.70 To be sure, both texts 
claim that the confusion was cleared up by the end of the late nine-
teenth century, because of the broadening of actual damages to 
include intangible harms.71 The story these texts tell, relied upon by 
the court in Cooper, is one in which punitive damages grew out of one 
function (compensating intangible injury) into another (punishment) 
because the conception of personal injury in nineteenth-century 
America grew broader and more sensitive to psychological harm. 
One might say that it is a story where "law follows function." 
65. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U .S. 1, 61 (1991). 
66. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1951). 
67. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES (1980). 
68. Id. § 2.3(A); Note, supra note 66, at 519-20. 
69. Note, supra note 66, at 520. 
70. See REDDEN, supra note 67 § 2.3(B) (discussing Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske (1820); 
Wiggin v. Coffin (1836)); Note, supra note 66, at 519 (discussing Merest v. Harvey (1814)). 
71. REDDEN, supra note 67, § 2.3(B) ("[The mid-nineteenth century was] to witness an 
almost total eclipse of the compensatory function precedent to, although very nearly contempo-
raneous with, the growing incidence of actual damage recovery for mental suffering"); Note, 
surpa note 66, at 520. 
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The law follows function argument has a certain pedigree. It can 
be traced back to the debate in the middle of the nineteenth century 
between two of America's leading scholars. Theodore Sedgwick (a 
practicing lawyer and an editor) and Harvard's Simon Greenleaf 
sparred very publicly over punitive damages. Professor Greenleaf 
argued that punitive damages were a mistake because they confused 
public and private law functions. Thus, in his very influential Treatise 
on the Law of Evidence, Greenleaf categorically rejected punitive 
damages.72 Sedgwick, who wrote an equally influential treatise 
entitled A Treatise on the Measure of Damages, rejected Greenleaf's 
methods and conclusions.73 The law, Sedgwick argued in 1847, 
"permits the jury to give what it terms punitory, vindictive, or exem-
plary damages; in other words, blends together the interest of society 
and the aggrieved individual, and gives damages not only to recom-
pense the sufferer but to punish the offender."74 
Sedgwick was right-only a handful of courts opposed punitive 
damages.75 But Greenleaf and his defenders were not impressed by 
the fact that both English and American common law were commit-
ted to the concept of exemplary or punitive damages. Their point was 
that, as Thomas Street argued, it really made no difference what the 
courts said, since "damages which in one jurisdiction are recoverable 
as exemplary damages are, in another jurisdiction, recovered under 
the guise of compensatory damages for mental suffering, insult, or 
outrage."76 Even Sedgwick had to admit that there was a tendency 
72. 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 240 n.2 (16th ed. 
1899). 
73. According to Perry Miller, Sedgwick considered Greenleaf to be an academic formalist 
and a "logic chopper." See THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA 184 (Perry Miller ed., 1962) (quoting 
Sedgwick). It is tempting to view Sedgwick as a protorealist and antiformalist, but Morton 
Horwitz cautions against this view. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 83 (1977). 
74. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 39 (Arno Press 
1972) (1847). 
75. At various times between 1860 and 1920, Massachusetts, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Louisiana, Nebraska, Washington, Michigan, and New Hampshire had rejected punitive 
damages. See 1 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 358 
(9th ed., 1912); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive 
Damages: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U . L. REV. 1269, 1302 (1993). 
76. 1 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 480 (1906). He 
noted that in Wisconsin, the same intentional tort was tried three times, twice with jury 
instructions permitting exemplary damages, and once without, and that the verdict awarded in 
each trial was the same. Id. (citing Bass v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 36 Wis. 450 (1875); Bass v. 
Chicago, etc. R. Co., 39 Wis. 636 (1878); Bass v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 42 Wis. 654 (1881)). 
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among some states, such as West Virginia, to call damages for pain 
and suffering exemplary damages.77 
The most famous defense of the Greenleaf position is Justice 
Foster's opinion in Fay v. Parker, which roundly attacks punitive 
damages as a "deformity" on "the sound and healthy body of the 
law."78 Justice Foster's objection was not that he thought that a jury 
should not hear evidence of a defendant's proven malice in determin-
ing damages. Justice Foster, an avowed opponent to punitive dam-
ages, thought it was obvious that sometimes the amount of pain and 
suffering experienced by the plaintiff was a function of the defen-
dant's motive. His opposition to punitive damages stemmed from the 
fact that they were an impermissible form of "double counting": 
Call them what you may, compensatory in fact, or punitory in their 
operation; if the same damages are awarded but once the distinc-
tion is merely verbal ... when we tell juries to give the plaintiff 
what the defendant ought to pay and the plaintiff ought to receive, 
in view of the wrong and suffering inflicted by the malice, insult, 
and indignity exhibited by the circumstances of the case.79 
In fact, Justice Foster was intent on clearing up any misunder-
standing about where he and Greenleaf stood. He noted that Sedg-
wick recruited Chancellor Kent as an ally.80 Kent, reported Sedgwick, 
denounced any attempt to '"exclude all considerations of the malice 
and wickedness and the wantonness"' of the tortfeasor in the calcula-
tion of the "'proper compensation of the victim. "'81 Justice Foster 
argued that Kent's denunciation was not directed at Greenleaf, since 
Greenleaf would have agreed with the sentiment.82 Kent was attack-
ing an anonymous writer in the Law Reporter who in 1847 argued that 
'"there would seem to be no reason why a plaintiff should receive 
greater damages from a defendant who has intentionally injured him, 
than one who has accidentally injured him, ... his loss being the same 
in both cases."'83 Justice Foster was quite angry that anyone would 
claim the view stated in the Law Reporter to be Greenleaf's or his. 
The view expressed in the Law Reporter was "so repugnant to 'social 
77. See SEDGWICK, supra note 75, § 359 (noting that Nevada and Wyoming follow the 
same practice). 
78. 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1872) . 
79. Id. at361-62. 
80. Id. at 357, (citing SEDGWICK ON DAMAGES 466 (5th ed.); 1 KENT'S COM. 606 (11th 
ed.)). 
81. Id. (quoting 1 KENT'S COM. 606 (11th ed.)). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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sympathy' that it would be monstrous, if it were not, instead, ridicu-
lous. "84 It was, in short, a straw man, and it did not represent the true 
viewpoint of the opponents to Sedgwick's theory of punitive damages. 
The true theory of compensation that Greenleaf held, according 
to Justice Foster, was quite subtle. It was based on the fact that "an 
injury to property or character is totally different from an injury to 
feelings." 85 Compensation for pain should come in two forms. The 
first is purely subjective: what did the plaintiff experience as a conse-
quence of the injury? The second is intersubjective: what did the 
plaintiff experience as a consequence of the defendant possessing a 
certain attitude when the tort occurred? Justice Foster therefore 
argued that tortfeasors who engage in intentional torts inflict two 
different injuries when they cause the victim to suffer: 
[I]f A plunges his knife into B and bums his house and accuses him 
of forgery, and the person and property and reputation of B are 
injured thereby, such injuries to person, property, and reputation 
are not spoken of as injuries to the spirit, or soul, or mind. The 
knife causes pain, but the pain is always taken in the sense of bodily 
pain only; and if we have reference to the mental suffering, the 
sense of disgrace, the wounded honor, &c., we always go on to de-
scribe it by other words than "injuries to person, property, and 
character. "86 
The distinction drawn by Justice Foster seems easy to accept: 
physical pain and mental suffering are simply different sorts of 
hedonic loss. The fear that arises during an assault, for example, is 
not physical pain because, by definition, it is in anticipation of physi-
cal contact and pain.87 But just because there is a difference between 
physical pain and mental suffering does not mean that mental suffer-
ing was "in fact" what punitive damages were compensating. To see 
why, recall that the tort of assault was one of the earliest torts.88 
Courts routinely awarded compensatory damages for mental suffer-
ing throughout the nineteenth century. And while courts routinely 
awarded punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages in 
assault, there is no evidence to suggest that they were awarding 
punitive damages (when they awarded punitive damages) in order to 
satisfy a functional need that could not be fulfilled by existing doc-
84. Id. at 360. 
85. Id. at 358. 
86. Id. at 359 (emphasis added). 
87. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 21 cmt. c, 24 cmt. c, 29 cm.ta, 905 cmt. e. 
88. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 10 (4th ed. 1971) 
(citing cases from fourteenth- and seventeenth-century England). 
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trinal categories. In fact, it appears that courts had no trouble distin-
guishing between mental suffering (which was the basis of awarding 
damages to compensate the victim) and punitive damages (which 
were awarded, but not to compensate the victim). For example, in 
Newell v. Whitcher, the plaintiff was a young blind woman who was 
the target of threatening sexual demands.89 The Supreme Court of 
Vermont held that the defendant's conduct (leaning over the plaintiff 
"with the proffer of criminal sexual intercourse") was actionable 
assault and upheld the jury verdict of $225 compensatory damages for 
mental suffering and $100 punitive damages without comment.90 If, as 
Justice Foster argued, punitive damages were needed to make up a 
gap in the court's ability to recognize and compensate mental suffer-
ing, why were the courts able to recognize, measure, and compensate 
the injury resulting from assault in a case like Newell? Under the 
logic urged by the law follows function argument, assault should have 
been entirely a matter of punitive damages-and yet the cases reveal 
just the opposite. 
For Justice Foster and Greenleaf, the question was not whether 
nineteenth-century tort law was able to compensate some forms of 
mental suffering, but whether the tort law could recognize the mental 
suffering that was associated with the award of punitive damages. 
Mental suffering resulting from a "sense of disgrace [or] wounded 
honor" was in need of punitive damages' crypto-compensatory 
function, since it would have otherwise been left unremedied.91 It is 
crucial to see that the category of mental suffering at issue is not 
defined so much by its scale (extreme distress vs. minor anxiety) or its 
connection to physical manifestation ("pure" emotional distress vs. 
consequential emotional distress), but its etiology. The injury identi-
fied by Justice Foster and Greenleaf is one in which the subjective 
mental state of the defendant changes the subjective experience of 
the victim. The injury is found not in the insult expressed by the 
defendant, but in its effect on the victim. In this way, the damages 
that result from insult are unlike the damages that result from defa-
mation. In defamation, the injury caused by a false statement is to 
one's reputation, not to one's feelings. 92 According to Justice Foster 
89. 53 Vt. 589, 590-91 (1880). 
90. Id. at 589-91. 
91. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559. More generally, a defamatory 
statement was a statement that "caused the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided by oth-
ers . .. lowering her in the esteem of the community or deterring people from associating or 
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and Greenleaf, the injurious aspect of insulting and humiliating 
tortuous conduct lay exactly in its reception by the victim.93 
Once one defines the precise contours of the type of injury that 
the "punitive damages equals compensation" camp describes as the 
primary focus of punitive damages in the nineteenth century, it is 
clear that, on one descriptive level, it was correct: the tort law did not 
recognize as a separate compensable form of mental suffering the 
hedonic loss flowing from being subjected to insult and disgrace. If it 
were really the case that the law viewed such losses as palpable in the 
same way that it viewed physical pain or the mental suffering caused 
by assault, then the law follows function argument would be strength-
ened by evidence that the law came to recognize such damages as 
palpable damages for which compensation ought to be paid. As I will 
show below, however, there is very little evidence that the common 
law ever revealed a suppressed desire to recognize such a category of 
hedonic loss, either in the nineteenth century or even later, under the 
tort of the intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). 
As an initial matter, the evidence that any court conceived of 
"insult" as a compensable category in tort in the nineteenth century is 
ambiguous at best. For example, in 1872 the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court went as far as distinguishing between two types of compensa-
tory damages: those which may be recovered for "actual" loss (which 
includes "loss of time, bodily pain and suffering, impaired physical or 
mental powers, mutilation and disfigurement, necessary expenses of 
surgical and other attendance,") and those for "injuries to the feel-
ings" (which includes "the insult, the indignity, the public exposure 
and contumely;"); however, this second category was only available if 
the defendant was "animated by a malicious motive."94 But in 1875 
dealing with her. " DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 403 (2000). This has been understood 
to mean false statements that lead others to believe reputation-harming false things about the 
victim. Insults, of course, may be hurtful even if they are believed by no one. The common law 
of defamation left some conceptual space for defamatory statements that were neither true nor 
false. See Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936) (plaintiff was photographed in 
way that was grotesque but obviously unrealistic; court found that falsity was not an element of 
defamation). 
93. This is why a number of courts in the nineteenth century held that a plaintiff who 
provoked a defendant's immoral and illegal act could only recover mitigated punitive damages, 
regardless of the evidence the plaintiff might have as to the actual emotional distress that the 
defendant's wrongdoing may have caused, as evidenced by the fact that the defendant would 
still be obliged to pay full compensatory damages. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
94. Wilson v. Young, 31 Wis. 574,582 (1872). Unlike the New Hampshire Supreme Court, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court had no trouble adopting Justice Foster's theory of the varieties of 
compensatory damages and also awarding punitive damages: 
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the court reversed itself, noting that in trying to understand Sedgwick, 
it had grown confused.95 It now understood that Sedgwick had meant 
to distinguish between: 
"[T]he mental suffering produced by the act or omission in ques-
tion: vexation: anxiety:" which he holds to be ground for compensa-
tory damages: and the "sense of wrong or insult, in the sufferer's 
breast from an act dictated by a spirit of willful injustice, or by a 
deliberate intention to vex, degrade, or insult," which he holds to 
be ground for exemplary damages only.96 
The former category, something that Greenleaf's nemesis was 
more than willing to concede, was entirely a matter of compensation, 
since "vexation" and "anxiety" are mental deprivations, that are not, 
in the end, a function of the tortfeasor's state of mind.97 The latter 
category, on the other hand, might be. It was this second category 
about which Sedgwick was skeptical. 
[I]njuries to the feelings ... [for] the insult, the indignity, the public exposure and 
contumely, and the like . . . [which] unlike those for mere personal and bodily in-
jury . .. can only be recovered when the aggressor is animated by a malicious motive-
when there is an intention on his part to outrage the feelings of the injured party. 
[Yet] the right to recover exemplary damages rests upon precisely the same grounds. 
Id. (citing SEDGWICK ON DAMAGES at 33) (emphasis added). 
95. Craker v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 657,677 (1875). 
96. Id. (quoting SEDGWICK, MEASURE -OF DAMAGES at 35). 
97. A tortfeasor's state of mind may add to or increase a plaintiff's vexation or anxiety (I 
would be more afraid if I knew that my assailant's purpose was to kill me and not just injure 
me), but that is just to say that victims rationally attribute a greater probability of suffering an 
injury to situations where the tortfeasor has exhibited a proportionately greater ability to inflict 
the injury. Emotional suffering resulting from a rational response to a threat is not a response 
to insult but to threat. 
There is a middle ground between Greenleafs and Sedgwick's positions, which is that 
Sedgwick is correct as a matter of theory, but that Greenleaf is right as a matter of practice. 
That is to say, that the mental suffering called "anxiety" and "vexation," which is the subject of 
compensatory damages, is distinct and separate from the wrong of " insult" and "humiliation," 
which is itself not an injury but might produce "anxiety" and "vexation," but that there is no 
way for juries to separate the two in practice. In Craker the court made just this argument: 
[Of course] mental suffering, vexation and anxiety are subject of compensation in 
damages. And it is difficult to see how these are to be distinguished from the sense of 
wrong and insult arising from injustice and the intention to vex and degrade . . . . But if 
there be a subtle, metaphysical distinction which we cannot see, what human creature 
can penetrate the mysteries of his own sensations, and parcel out separately his mental 
suffering and his sense of wrong-so much for compensatory, and so much for vindic-
tive damages? .. . If possible, juries are surely not metaphysicians to do it. 
Id. at 678. 
There was a reason for the court's willingness to fudge the border between compensatory 
and punitive damages, even in the teeth of Sedgwick's distinction: the defendant in this case was 
a railway, and at the time the case was brought, Wisconsin, like many states, would not have 
allowed the plaintiff to recover punitive damages against the railway in respondeat superior at 
all. So, if evidence of the defendant's employee's malice was to be properly placed before the 
jury, it could not be in order to measure punitive damages based on the employee 's subjective 
state of mind. 
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Of course, one might argue that the absence of any explicit char-
acterization of the "sense of wrong or insult, in the sufferer's breast 
from an act dictated by a spirit of willful injustice, or by a deliberate 
intention to vex, degrade, or insult" as compensable mental suffering 
in the nineteenth century proves nothing, since it was exactly the 
absence of judicial recognition that forced these damages to travel 
under the guise of punitive damages. But that is not exactly correct, 
as the two cases from Wisconsin illustrate. Furthermore, legal 
scholars in the nineteenth century were already developing a contem-
poraneous version of the law follows function argument. Thomas 
Street took the position that Greenleaf was ultimately correct in that 
the "true goal" of tort law is to compensate only, but that arguments 
like the one made by Justice Foster were premature: 
What seems really to have happened here, is that in the course of 
legal development the law of damage has outstripped the concep-
tion of legal wrong .. . . 
If it had been practicable for the judges to analyze and define for 
the jury with precision all the elements of legal harm which enter 
into every case, there would have been no necessity for the recogni-
tion of the idea of punishment as a proper end in the administration 
of the law of civil wrong. But they did not essay this task 
and . .. [ t ]he doctrine of exemplary damages answered this end well 
enough for practical purposes, and hence gained currency. As our 
theory of wrong catches up with the law of damage, the idea of pun-
ishment will appear more and more out of place in the civil system, 
and it may possibly in time altogether disappear.98 
Street was making a prediction - that someday the tort law 
would develop completely and no longer need the fiction of punitive 
damages. He admitted that day had not yet arrived by 1906.99 But it 
is crucial to the law follows function argument that such a day must 
have arrived at some point near the end of the nineteenth century, if 
the historical claim about the recession of punitive damages' compen-
satory function is to make any sense. One might argue that Street's 
prediction has been proven true by the emergence of the tort of 
IIED. This argument would not have been as helpful to the Court in 
Cooper as would appear at first glance, since even if it were true, it 
would have left an embarrassing lacuna of at least fifty years. 100 
98. STREET, supra note 76, at 488 (emphasis added). 
99. Id. 
100. The tort of IIED is of relatively recent vintage. It was recognized in the Restatement 
of Torts in 1948, although it had been the subject of intense scholarly speculation before that 
date. See, e.g., Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 
HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936). The argument made by the Court is that punitive damages ceased 
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Regardless of its theoretical value, the argument has a worse defect: it 
is simply wrong as a doctrinal matter. The early punitive damages 
cases were not proto-IIED cases, and one would have to stretch the 
doctrine far out of shape to fit those cases into IIED as it has come to 
be known in this century. 
IIED is actionable when the defendant (1) causes severe emo-
tional distress, (2) intentionally or recklessly, (3) by extreme and 
outrageous conduct.101 There is no question that IIED is a tort in 
which punitive damages are available-as an intentional tort, proof of 
the underlying tort creates a set of circumstances where the predicate 
of punitive damages would be proven as well. But that is not relevant 
to the issue at hand. The question is whether the torts that were 
brought under the rubric of punitive damages before the tort of IIED 
was recognized were torts that today would be recognized as satisfy-
ing the elements of the tort defined in Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 46. 
The historical record suggests that the answer would be "no." It 
is true that many of the cases involving common carriers-especially 
railroads-that were brought throughout the end of the nineteenth 
century and the early part of the twentieth century look like primitive 
versions of IIED. 102 Here, of course, there is an entirely different 
possible explanation, which is that the tort law had already recog-
nized that common carriers, as well as innkeepers, had elevated duties 
to the public. As Dobbs noted, "[t)he special liability of carriers was 
somewhat peculiar and courts today might well conclude that liability 
for a carrier's insult alone is no longer justified because more finely 
tuned rules now apply to all defendants." 103 The tort of IIED is 
distinct from the liability of common carriers and innkeepers because 
serving a compensatory function by the end of the nineteenth century because the interest for 
which they insured compensation-wounded feelings-was now deemed compensable under 
personal injury law. 
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46. 
102. For example, railroads and trolley companies were he ld liable for , among other things, 
"wrongfully ejecting passengers; carrying passengers past their stations; accosting patrons in 
insulting fashions; failing to stop when signaled; failing to care for known sick; refusing to carry 
the blind; allowing insults and fights; willfully delaying of passengers; and obstructing the 
tracks." Alfred G. Nichols, Jr., Comment, Punitive Damages in Mississippi-A Brief Survey, 37 
Miss. L.J. 131 , 138 (1965) (citations omitted). Consequently, one of the most important debates 
surrounding punitive damages at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth was whether corporations should be held liable for the intentional and insulting 
conduct of their agents. See Seymour D. Thompson, Liability of Corporations for Exemplary 
Damages, 41 CENT. L.J. 308,309 (1895). 
103. DOBBS, supra note 92, § 303. 
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of the requirement that the defendant cause severe emotional distress 
through outrageous behavior. 
Perhaps, seen through the eyes of nineteenth-century legal cul-
ture, the acts that led to the award of punitive damages were not 
merely insulting (which is how we may view them today), but were 
experienced, within the culture in which they took place, as giving rise 
to extreme emotional responses. Barring a full historical and socio-
logical study of the meaning of "insult" in nineteenth-century Amer-
ica, the next best way to test this hypothesis would be to look at the 
cases that Street chose for his chapter on punitive damages in his 
treatise.104 It was in this book that Street propounded the argument to 
which I referred above-that, in theory, the law should be able to 
describe hedonic loss so precisely that the full compensation of those 
losses would render punitive damages unnecessary. 105 The chapter on 
punitive damages selects nine exemplars from English and American 
tort law in which "the assessment of exemplary dam-
ages ... illustrate[ s] the steps by which the doctrine has taken 
shape."106 Given this view, one might think that the examples chosen 
by Street would illustrate his argument. If his prediction was that one 
day the tort law's theory of wrong would "catch up" with the 
compensatory ideal, and one believes that the theory of wrong to 
which he was referring concerned the wrong of IIED, then one would 
think that we should be able to map the early punitive damages cases 
selected by Street onto the modem tort of IIED. 107 So a brief review 
of the nine cases is warranted. 
1. Huckle v. Money (1763): 108 In this well-known early punitive 
damages case, the defendant was the "king's messenger," or, in other 
words, the government of England. The King had arrested the 
plaintiff, a printer, because he had printed a newspaper critical of the 
Crown's policies. Despite the fact that the plaintiff had been treated 
courteously while in custody, the court found that punitive damages 
were allowable. 
104. One of the best attempts to do something like this, with a focus on the different ways 
private law has allowed compensation for insult in Germany and France (but not the United 
States) is James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 
1279 (2000). 
105. STREET, supra note 76, at 479, 488-89. 
106. Id. at 483. 
107. Nor is Street's sample set idiosyncratic. Many of the nine cases are part of the usual list 
which appears in classic and modern scholarship on punitive damages. 
108. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). 
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2. Tullidge v. Wade (1769): 109 Like many early punitive damages 
cases, this was a case against the defendant for the seduction of the 
plaintiff's daughter. The court stressed that the damages were for the 
public "insult" expressed by the defendant's act. 
3. Merest v. Harvey (1814): 11 0 The plaintiff was a gentleman and 
the defendant was a magistrate and a member of parliament. The 
defendant asked to join the plaintiff's shooting party, and upon being 
refused, insulted the plaintiff. The court stressed that punitive 
damages in this case should be seen as a substitute for dueling. 
4. Sears v. Lyons (1818): 111 The defendant trespassed on the 
plaintiff's farm and poisoned his chickens. The court said that the 
jury could "consider also the object with which it [the poisoned 
barley] was thrown" and award punitive damages in excess of the 
replacement value of the livestock. 
5. Warwick v. Foulkes (1844): 112 This was another case of false 
imprisonment, although today it would be called abuse of process. 
The defendant charged the plaintiff with a felony and then recanted 
his accusation at trial. The court held that the defendant's "persis-
tence" in maintaining this false charge could be taken into account to 
warrant the award of punitive damages. 
6. Emblen v. Myers (1860):' 13 The defendant wanted the land 
owned by his neighbor, the plaintiff. The defendant arranged to have 
two old houses pulled down on his own property in such a way that 
they fell onto the plaintiff's property, destroying the plaintiff's stable. 
The court approved an instruction which allowed punitive damages if 
the defendant acted "with a high hand." 
7. Borland v. Barrett (1882): 114 The defendant had been assigned 
seats in a hotel dining room for a long period of time. When he 
returned from a trip, he discovered the plaintiff in his wife's seat. 
Upon the plaintiff's refusal to vacate the seat, the defendant hit the 
plaintiff over the head with a bottle of sauce and an ugly scene 
ensued. The jury was instructed that it may award punitive damages. 
109. 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (K.B. 1769). 
110. 129 Eng. Rep. 761 (1814). 
111. 171 Eng. Rep. 658 (1818). 
112. 152 Eng. Rep. 1298 (1844). 
113. 158 Eng. Rep. 23 (1860) . 
114. 76 Va. 128 (1882). 
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8. Smith v. Holcomb (1868): 115 The report of the case, which 
states that the defendant struck the plaintiff, does not give more 
detail. The court held that the jury should award punitive damages, 
since in a case of battery, "[t]he insult and indignity inflicted upon a 
person by giving him a blow with anger, rudeness or inso-
lence ... [may] constitute the principal element [ of the mental 
suffering]."116 
9. Keyse v. Keyse (1886): 117 The tort case, which arose in the con-
text of a divorce proceeding, was for the alienation of affections. The 
plaintiff, the husband in the divorce, sued the defendant, the wife's 
corespondent, for damages. The court said that the jury was not to 
"punish at all" but could take into account the destruction of the 
plaintiff's "happy life" by the defendant. 
These cases describe a fascinating variety of circumstances under 
which punitive damages were awarded, but they do not, in my opin-
ion, describe the functional equivalent of IIED. Huckle and Warwick 
would certainly warrant punitive damages today, but not because they 
are cases of IIED. They are cases of false imprisonment conjoined 
with an abuse of process, either by the state or a private citizen. 
While such intentional torts are wrong according to the common law 
and under applicable civil rights statutes, the ground for their being 
wrong is not that they are forms of outrageous conduct that cause 
extreme emotional distress ( although sometimes they may be just 
that). One might argue that the real ground for punitive damages in 
Huckle is that "oppressive conduct of government agents" is the 
insult, not the imprisonment. 118 This would put Huckle and Warwick 
on the same conceptual footing as Merest. That may be the case, but 
that still does not mean that the "oppressive conduct" punished in 
these cases is functionally the mental suffering for which compensa-
tory damages are awarded in IIED. The injury sustained by the 
printer in Huckle, the criminal defendant in Warwick, or the noble-
man in Merest was not like the injuries that comprise typical horn-
115. 99 Mass. 552 (1868). 
116. Id. at 554-55. 
117. 11 P.D. 100 (1886). 
118. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 75, at 1287. 
In Huckle , a false imprisonment and trespass action against agents of the King, Lord 
Camden's introduction of the term "exemplary damages" comprised the first use of the 
phrase as a formal legal doctrine. English courts employed the remedy from that point 
on to punish and deter the misuse of wealth and power that threatened the eighteenth 
century English social order. 
Id. at 1288-89. 
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book examples of modern IIED cases, such as the injury suffered by 
an African American who is subjected to repeated and threatening 
racial epithets in the course of doing business or a woman who is 
subjected to repeated and threatening sexual advances.119 
Sears and Emblen are even more troublesome cases for the ar-
gument that the injuries once captured by punitive damages are those 
now addressed by IIED. From a psychological and doctrinal point of 
view, economic torts are not obviously the most fertile ground upon 
which to base a claim for extreme emotional distress based on outra-
geous conduct.120 Certainly the common law has allowed IIED claims 
to be based on the intentional destruction of chattel: in LaPorte v. 
Associated Independents, Inc., the court allowed punitive damages 
where the defendant maliciously destroyed the plaintiff's dog in her 
presence.121 But in a case like that, the intent of the defendant is to 
produce extreme emotional distress by means of property destruc-
tion. In the cases cited by Street, it appears that the defendant's goal 
was to interfere with the economic interests of the plaintiff. Even if 
one could presume that the defendant had to have been substantially 
certain that his destruction of the plaintiff's chattel would evoke an 
emotional reaction, it seems that the real purpose of awarding puni-
tive damages for poisoning chickens or destroying a barn was to 
punish the defendant for intentional interference with the plaintiff's 
interests. In this sense, cases like Sears and Emblen are analogous to 
Cooper, TXO, and Gore. There may be many valid reasons to 
support punitive damages in cases involving willful interference with 
another's economic interests, ranging from retribution to deterrence, 
but compensation for emotional distress does not seem to be the right 
description. 
The remaining cases discussed by Street, Tullidge, Borland, 
Smith, and Keyse, could all be viewed as concerning, on one level or 
another, insults leveled by the defendant towards the plaintiff. When 
one harms another through sexual impropriety, one holds the other 
up to social humiliation and ridicule. When one hits another, espe-
119. It is instructive to compare the cases in Street's list with modern cases of IIED. See, 
e.g., Brown v. Manning, 764 F. Supp. 183 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Ford v. Revlon, Inc. , 734 P.2d 580 
(Ariz. 1987). 
120. Damages for intentional interference with an economic interest may include emotional 
distress under limited circumstances, usually involving a special relationship or a special 
vulnerability on the part of the victim. Emotional distress comprises an important component 
of claims for bad faith breach of insurance contract. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 795 
P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). 
121. 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964). 
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cially in public, one is telling the victim that his social status is so low 
that the law does not protect him. Marc Galanter and David Luban 
argue that tortfeasors who assert "undeserved mastery" over tort 
victims inflict an "injury to honor" that can only be compensated 
through punitive damages: 
[C]ulpably harming another person or being culpably negligent ex-
presses a false view of the wrongdoer's value relative to that of the 
victim. Implicitly it says that the victim is a "low" person, the sort of 
person toward whom one can act in such a manner. Or it says that 
the wrongdoer is more valuable than the victim, indeed an espe-
cially valuable and "high" kind of person, the sort of person who is 
entitled to take liberties with the well-being of others. Or it says 
both: the wrongdoer is especially valuable and the victim is the sort 
of person that it is all right to treat badly. I am high and you are 
low.122 
The problem with this argument is that it may be an accurate de-
scription of the function of punitive damages, both today and in the 
past, but it does not establish what the law follows function argument 
needs to prove. It is very likely that the victims in Tullidge, Borland, 
Smith, and Keyse were insulted by the defendants' acts. It is also 
possible that Galanter and Luban are correct in that the sort of insult 
experienced by the victims in these cases comes from the defendants' 
contemptible desire to express mastery over others. But there needs 
to be a connection between the insult experienced by the victims and 
the attitudes of the injurers that would support the conclusion that 
the injury that resulted is functionally identical to extreme emotional 
distress based on outrageous conduct. It is only this latter claim that 
would be of any use to someone like Street or Greenleaf. Galanter 
122. Galanter & Luban, supra note 53, at 1432-33 (citing Jean Hampton, The Retributive 
Idea, in JEAN HAMPTON & JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 157 (1988)). 
To illustrate their point, Galanter and Luban refer back to early punitive damages cases: 
In Grey v. Grant [1764) the court upheld a punitive award because " the plaintiff [had) 
been used unlike a gentleman." The court in Huckle v. Money stated that "the state, 
degree, quality, trade or profession of the party injured, as well as of the person who 
did the injury, must be and generally are, considered by a jury in giving damages." 
And in Forde v. Skinner [1830] , the jury was instructed that if the hair of female pau-
pers was cut off in a poor house against their will "with the malicious intent . . . of 
' taking down their pride,' . .. that will be an aggravation and ought to increase the 
damages." 
Id. at 1433-34 (alterations in original); see also Ellis, supra note 3, at 14-15. 
The reported cases from roughly the first quarter of the seventeenth century through 
the first quarter of the nineteenth century .. . [t)hey included cases of slander, seduc-
tion, assault and battery in humiliating circumstances, criminal conversion, malicious 
prosecution, illegal intrusion into private dwellings and seizure of private papers, tres-
pass onto private land in an offensive manner, and false imprisonment. Diverse as 
they may have been, all of these cases share one common attribute: they involved acts 
that resulted in affronts to the honor of the victims. 
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and Luban did not insist that the reason that punitive damages are 
justified is because they are a form of compensation for mental 
suffering. In fact, they argued that punitive damages, although 
triggered by the defendant's insulting behavior, are not explicable in 
terms of compensation: 
In our view, awarding compensatory damages alone may not suffice 
to remedy this injury to honor, but may actually iterate it. The 
norm of exacting from the wrongdoer compensation equivalent to 
the victim's loss measures the "deserved" loss of the wrongdoer by 
the undeserved loss of the victim.123 
Galanter and Luban did not characterize the wrongs resulting 
from the defendants' conduct in a case like Tullidge or Borland in 
terms of emotional distress because they had no interest in deploying 
a compensation-based argument. Their view was that the justification 
for punitive damages is that it is a special form of retribution (what 
they called "poetic justice").124 So even if Galanter and Luban are 
correct and the rationale for the award of punitive damages in many 
of the early (and even contemporary) cases is that the defendant's 
conduct inflicted an insult upon the victim, their argument does not 
support the view that the institution of punitive damages was an early 
attempt to provide damages for emotional distress. 125 
Ill. WHAT FUNCTIONS DID PUNITIVE DAMAGES SERVE IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY? 
According to the sources cited by the Court in footnote eleven of 
Cooper, punitive damages once served a compensatory function and 
now they do not. The injury that was once compensated through 
punitive damages is hard to specify. The most natural place to look 
for a description of that injury would be in the arguments made by 
Greenleaf and his supporters, since they also argued that punitive 
damages were really just a form of compensatory damages. But as we 
have seen, there is a gap between Greenleaf's argument and the 
Court's. The Court's argument, that the law of punitive damages 
follows the functions it is required to serve under the circumstances of 
123. Galanter & Luban, supra note 53, at 1433. 
124. Id. at 1438. 
125. If the Galanter and Luban argument could be used to support the law follows function 
argument, then they would be embarrassed, since, unlike the Court in Cooper or the sources it 
cites, they believe that punitive damages still provide damages in response to insult. The whole 
point of the Cooper argument is to draw a distinction between the emotional distress compensa-
tion function of the past and the public policy punishment function of today. 
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the day, is testable. If punitive damages served a compensatory 
function that is today recognized as a compensable loss, then the 
earlier function was made unnecessary by changes in the law. The 
form of injury which Greenleaf claimed was being compensated by 
punitive damages-the mental suffering resulting from mere insult-
is not today a form of compensable injury cognizable under current 
tort law.126 Therefore, reliance on Greenleaf cannot help the law 
follows function argument. It still lacks any empirical support. 
Furthermore, there is another reason to doubt the law follows 
function argument: it requires us to disregard much of what the courts 
and other commentators said were the functions of punitive damages 
at that time. The challenge to the Court, if it wants to rely on the 
sources cited in footnote eleven, is that the record is replete with 
statements describing the function of punitive damages as some form 
of punishment or retribution, not compensation for emotional dis-
tress. 
The positions taken by the majority of courts that adopted the 
view that punitive damages were punishment are not uniform and I 
will review them in this Section. However, I must acknowledge the 
obvious response that the proponents of the law follows function 
argument would raise at the outset. They could, I suppose, accept 
that many courts and commentators believed that punitive damages 
served a punishment function without actually realizing the compen-
satory function that the damages truly served. Such an argument is 
not implausible, but it is difficult to disprove. In the face of such 
uncertainty, the only thing we can do is weigh what the courts actually 
said they were doing then against what they actually are doing now. 
On both these counts, the law follows function argument lacks 
obvious support. 
In my opinion, the leading judicial opinions in the mid-
nineteenth century reveal a range of rationales for punitive damages, 
and while it would be difficult to say that the weight of opinion clearly 
falls to one side or another, it would be even more difficult to say that 
126. This is not to say that Greenleaf was wrong. He was not arguing that the law would 
reclassify the damages awarded under punitive damages as compensatory damages. That is the 
law follows function argument. It presumes that awarding damages conditioned on the 
wrongdoer's motive was just a fig-leaf for increasing the final measure of the victim's mental 
suffering. It is possible that Street, in fact, did hold the "fig leaf' position. I suspect that 
Greenleaf really did believe that damages conditioned on the wrongdoer's motive were 
compensatory, and that his dispute with Sedgwick, while merely verbal and nonoutcome 
determinative in most cases, had important theoretical and practical ramifications. 
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the weight of opinion supports the view that punitive damages 
functioned primarily to compensate emotional suffering. The cases 
can be placed into six categories: (1) compensation for emotional 
suffering; (2) compensation for insult; (3) personal vindication; ( 4) 
vindication of the state; (5) punishment to set an example; and (6) 
punishment to deter. While these categories overlap to some extent, 
and the decisions often suggest that more than one rationale is being 
adopted, the differences between the categories are worth noting. 
1. Compensation for emotional suffering. This rationale for pu-
nitive damages has been discussed fully in Section II. It could include 
what today is described as pain and suffering or emotional distress. It 
is crucial to the argument of the Court in Cooper that punitive 
damages served primarily to secure damages for emotional suffering 
in the nineteenth century; this would explain why, for so long, courts 
viewed punitive damages as a matter of fact wholly within the jury's 
purview. Very few judicial opinions embraced this view. The only 
major decision was Fay v. Parker, discussed above. Furthermore, 
while it is true that contemporaneous treatises such as Street's 
promoted this view (as part of the law follows function argument), it 
is not clear to me that Greenleaf necessarily held this view. 
2. Compensation for insult. One of Section Il's purposes was to 
point out that it is possible to see punitive damages as compensatory 
and yet still reject the court's view in Cooper that punitive damages 
once provided compensation for something which is now recognized 
under conventional modem categories of compensable emotional 
distress. That is to say, even if punitive damages did (and still) 
provide compensation for insult, that function may be utterly differ-
ent from the function of providing compensation for the sort of 
emotional distress that accompanies shock (in the case of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress) and extreme emotional distress (in 
the case of IIED). The loss one suffers when one is insulted may 
include a hedonic loss, such as embarrassment and humiliation, but 
not necessarily very much, and certainly not at the level that would 
rise to compensable emotional distress. One might still demand 
compensation for insult even if one did not experience a severe 
emotional or psychological feeling. 127 In both Germany and America 
127. Theron Metcalf put it this way: 
The circumstances of time and place, when and where the insult is given, require dif-
ferent damages; as it is a greater insult to be beaten upon the Royal Exchange, than in 
a private room .... (T]hat indignity and insult aggravate the accompanying injury; not 
that the injury, aside from the insult, is greater on account of the plaintiff's malice. 
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the same expression was used to capture the idea that insult and the 
feelings of wounded pride that accompany it is itself a loss: victims of 
insulting conduct would demand "satisfaction" or Genugtuung from 
the defendant. I have explored this idea in much greater detail 
elsewhere, and for present purposes I will merely note that regardless 
of whether one views "satisfaction" as a defensible rationale for 
punitive damages, it is not the same thing to which the Court in 
Cooper refers when it argues in footnote eleven that punitive dam-
ages served a compensatory function. 128 
A number of nineteenth-century courts cited compensation for 
insult as the rationale for the award of punitive damages. One of the 
clearest explanations for this conception of compensation is set out by 
the Supreme Court of Michigan in Detroit Dailey Post v. McArthur. 129 
The case involved the award of punitive damages in a libel case.130 
The court argued that vindictive or exemplary damages (the expres-
sion at the time for punitive damages) were awarded by the jury in 
proportion to evidence of "evil motives," which instantiate the "moral 
guilt of the perpetrator."rn The court acknowledged that, although 
punitive damages varied in direct proportion to the "blameworthiness 
chargeable on wrong-doers," it would be misleading to say that the 
damage award was therefore based on the "wrong intent" of the 
defendant: the award "is to make reparation for the injury to the 
feelings of the person injured. "132 The feelings to which the court 
refered were not, however, independent of the moral blameworthi-
ness of the defendant's act. 133 The court argued that our "instincts of 
common humanity" recognize that an injury inflicted voluntarily is 
"often the greatest wrong that can be inflicted, and injured pride and 
Theron Metcalf. Damages in Actions ex Delicto, 3 AM. JURIST & LAW MAG. 302--03 (1830) 
(quoting 3 Wils. 19). 
128. See Anthony J. Sebok, Legal Culture and the Desire for Retribution: Punishment in 
German and American Law (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Whitman, supra note 
104, at 1319-24. 
129. 16 Mich. 447 (1868). 
130. Id. at 450. 
131. Id. at 452. 
132. Id. at452-53. 
133. For this reason, the Michigan Supreme Court believed that it followed from their view 
that if the plaintiff was morally blameworthy for having provoked the defendant's intentional 
tort, the plaintiff could not claim compensation for wounded feelings even if the defendant's 
conduct was nonetheless tortuous and extremely insulting. The plaintiff would be limited to 
compensation for bodily pain and suffering only. See Johnson v. McKee, 27 Mich. 471 (1873). 
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affection may, under some circumstances, justify very heavy dam-
ages."134 
The reasoning offered by the Michigan Supreme Court reflected 
a response to the challenge, raised in a number of jurisdictions, that 
punitive damages were a form of double punishment. Other states 
followed Michigan's view that the function of punitive damages was 
to compensate for the losses resulting from insult. Minnesota, for 
example, explicitly adopted the expression "insult" to explain the 
source of the wounded feelings for which "punitory" or "exemplary 
damages" could be awarded. 135 Under the "compensation for insult" 
conception of punitive damages, punitive damages were not punish~, 
ment, so there was no double counting. The Court of Appeals o'f 
Kentucky noted that nothing barred a widow from suing for the death 
of her husband, even though the killer might be indicted for a felony: 
"[t)he recovery, in one case, is for the private injury, and in the other, 
the punishment is inflicted for the public wrong. "136 The court 
defended the . jury's punitive damage award against the defendant's 
argument that the jury instructions did not follow the principle that 
punitive damages were not supposed to compensate. 137 The judge had 
charged the jury thus: "by punitive damages is meant exemplary 
damages, by way of smart money, as well as those given by way of 
compensation."138 The court argued that there was nothing inconsis-
tent with this charge and its view that punitive damages were com-
pensatory, since: 
The (first set] of damages are allowed as compensation for the loss 
sustained, but the jury are permitted to give exemplary damages on 
account of the nature of the injury. It is therefore the increase of 
the damages resulting from the character of the defendant's conduct 
that is denominated punitive or vindictive. 139 
134. Detroit Daily Post Co., 16 Mich. at 453-54 (emphasis added). 
135. Minnesota, for example, explicitly adopted the expression "insult" to explain the source 
of the wounded feelings for which "punitory or "exemplary damages" could be awarded. Lynd 
v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 200-01(1862); McCarthy v. Niskern, 22 Minn. 90, 90--91 (1875). 
136. Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 146, 151 (1859). 
137. Id. at153-154. 
138. Id. at 153. 
139. Id. at 153-154 (emphasis added). The words in italics contain the heart of the 
distinction: the court recognized that the "nature" of the injury (the injured feelings of the 
decedent) is controlled not by the force of the defendant's gunshot but by the immoral motive 
that led to the gunshot (its "character"). 
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This view was also adopted by the Supreme Courts of Iowa and 
California.140 
3. Personal vindication. One of the common expressions for pu-
nitive damages in the nineteenth century was "vindictive damages." 
Vindication is obviously not the same thing as compensation, al-
though one could imagine how, under certain circumstances, the act 
of vindication might provide, at the same time, compensation for 
feelings wounded through insult. 141 From an etymological perspec-
tive, the word "vindicate" places the act of imposing punitive dam-
ages in a very different posture than the act of pursuing 
compensation. The Latin vindicare means to claim, to set free, or to 
punish. 142 The Oxford English Dictionary notes that early uses of the 
word "vindicate" include "to avenge," "to make or set free" or 
"rescue," and "to clear from censure."143 All these senses of the word 
suggest that punitive damages, when used to "vindicate" the plaintiff, 
allowed the plaintiff to actively address the defendant, and in doing 
so, recover or "rescue" his or her honor. In this sense, punitive 
damages had a slightly different emphasis than in the sense of com-
pensation. First, the implication in the word "vindicate" is that the 
money received does not replace a loss, but is a means by which the 
plaintiff's lost honor is returned. Second, it implies that the payment 
of the money to the plaintiff is less important than the imposition of 
the monetary penalty on the defendant. That is why, of course, 
punitive damages in their vindictive form seem to be as much about 
punishing the defendant as compensating the plaintiff. 
The United States Supreme Court adopted the personal vindica-
tion rationale for punitive damages in Day v. Woodworth in 1851.144 
The case involved a trespass by a mill owner against the downstream 
dam erected by another mill owner.145 There was no personal injury 
and, in modern terms, no credible claim for emotional distress. Yet 
the Court allowed the punitive damages. 146 The Court, after noting 
the controversy surrounding "what are called exemplary, punitive, or 
vindictive" damages, argued that it is the very intangibility of wrong 
140. Wardrobe v. Cal. Stage Co., 7 Cal. 118 (1857); Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379 
(1866). But see Turner v. N. Beach & Mission R.R. Co., 34 Cal. 594 (1868). 
141. I explore this possibility in Sebok, supra note 128. 
142. 19 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 641 (2d ed. 1989). 
143. Id. 
144. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851). 
145. Id. at 363. 
146. Id. at 370. 
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that results from lawless action which explains why such damages are 
set apart from compensatory damages: 
The wrong done to the plaintiff is incapable of being measured by a 
money standard; and the damages assessed depend on the circum-
stances showing the degree of moral turpitude or atrocity of the 
defendant's conduct, and may properly be termed . .. vindictive 
rather than compensatory.147 
The Supreme Court of Illinois explained vindictive damages as 
awarded "for the malice and insult" attending the wrong where the 
"jury is not bound to adhere to a strict line of compensation."148 
4. Vindication of the State. Closely related to personal vindica-
tion is the rationale that punitive damages were awarded to vindicate 
the insult to the state that the defendant expressed through his 
immoral and intentional tortuous conduct. The meanings and impli-
cations drawn from the etymology of the word "vindicate" are left 
undisturbed when one reads this rationale expressed by the courts, 
but the interest that is recovered by the act of imposing damages must 
naturally be restated. As this trial judge in San Francisco put it in his 
jury charge: 
Where a duty imposed by law is willfully and maliciously refused to 
be performed, or performed in such a way as to wound the feelings 
of the person to whom it is owing, the injury partakes more or less 
of a public character, and extends beyond the mere pecuniary dam-
age sustained by the party against whom it has been committed. 149 
It would appear that the courts that raised the possibility that 
punitive damages could be awarded to vindicate a violation of the 
public's rights were not denying that sometimes punitive damages 
were properly awarded to secure purely private vindication. In fact, it 
seems that the problem of "public" vindication was raised as a way to 
limit punitive damages. In both Indiana and Nebraska the Supreme 
Courts of those states took the position that punitive damages could 
not be available for actions committed in violation of the criminal 
law. Thus, a jury instruction that asked for punitive damages to 
"vindicate the law and punish the outrage upon the person of the 
147. Id. at 371. Similar reasoning was adopted by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Black 
v. Carrollton Railroad Co. , 10 La. Ann. 33, 40 (1855). 
148. City of Chic. v. Martin, 49 Ill. 241 , 244 (1868). It should be noted that the court gave a 
mix of rationales for vindictive damages, including "to make an example to the community" and 
" to deter (the defendant) and others." 
149. Turner v. N. Beach and Mission R.R. Co., 34 Cal. 594, 598 (1868) (quoting the trial 
judge). The California Supreme Court overturned the trial judge 's instructions but only because 
the defendant was an employer, not the employee who did the act. 
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plaintiff" was overturned. 150 According to the Indiana Supreme 
Court, if a tort was not the subject of criminal punishment, "the 
various rights in community to personal security" could be protected 
through punitive damages, but where the criminal law reached, "the 
state has undertaken to vindicate her own wrongs" and there was no 
reason why private individuals should take it upon themselves to 
vindicate the same wrong. 15 1 
5. Punishment to set an example. Along with the term "vindic-
tive," the other very popular expression for punitive damages in the 
nineteenth century was "exemplary" damages. The terms "vindic-
tive" and "exemplary" are as different to each other as both are to 
the term "punitive." "Exemplary" is rooted in the Latin for "exam-
ple," and according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the early usage 
of the word included both "serving for an illustration" as well as "a 
penalty such as may serve as a warning." 152 When used by courts, it is 
clear that exemplary damages were not designed to insure either 
compensation or vindication, although certainly either or both could 
have been benefits of exemplary damages. Exemplary damages were 
primarily designed for the instruction of the public. 153 In Freidenheit 
v. Edmundson, the Supreme Court of Missouri suggested that in a 
case of trespass to chattel, the court properly instructed the jury to 
give more than the value of the goods and interest, because "such 
[additional] damages as would be a good round compensa-
tion ... such as might serve for a wholesome example to others in like 
cases. "154 The awarding of exemplary damages would of course 
comfort the plaintiff, but they were not necessarily portrayed as 
compensation for either emotional distress or insult: "[a]llowing 
damages for wounded feelings, humiliation, and the like is not 
equivalent to exemplary damages."155 
There is some temptation to say that exemplary damages served 
a deterrence rationale, and obviously there is a great deal of overlap 
150. Nossaman v. Rickert, 18. Ind. 350 (1862). 
151. Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854); see also Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68, 74 (1878) (citing 
Taber). 
152. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 525 (2d ed. 1989) 
153. "[T]he jury are authorized, for the sake of public example, to give such additional 
damages as the circumstances require. The tort is aggravated by the evil motive, and on this 
rests the rule of exemplary damages." Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489 
(1875). 
154. 36 Mo. 226, 230 (1865). 
155. 3 THOMAS G. SHERMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
NEGLIGENCE 1949 (6th ed. 1913). 
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between the concept of general deterrence and punishment for 
example's sake. But this would be too crude and hasty a picture of 
the meaning of exemplary damages. For example, in the 1791 case 
Coryell v. Colbaugh (a case of seduction), the defendant argued that 
the punitive damages assessed against him (if any) should be very 
small since he was poor, and, presumably, the compensatory damages 
alone would be enough to punish and deter him. 156 The court rejected 
this reasoning, arguing that because the reason to give exemplary 
damages was to "prevent such offences in [the] future," the jury was 
"bound to no certain damages, but might give such a sum as would 
mark [its] disapprobation, and be an example to others" regardless of 
the defendant's wealth.157 Not only is this use of exemplary damages 
clearly a rejection of specific deterrence, it suggests that the point of 
such damages was not to prevent similar acts by allowing future 
wrongdoers to weigh the cost of their wrongdoing, but to use the past 
wrongdoing as an opportunity for the community to frame a norm. 
Making an example of Colbaugh does not prevent future wrongdoing 
by setting a price but by clearly establishing the seriousness with 
which the community rejected the conduct in question. One might 
even describe the phenomenon of exemplary damages as a concrete 
example of the expressive use of punishment, where punishment is 
not inflicted to alter criminals' cost-benefit analysis but to alter 
criminals' sense of what would be tolerated by the communities in 
which they live every day. 1ss 
6. Punishment to deter. Given the ubiquity of deterrence as an 
explicit rationale for punitive damages in contemporary doctrine and 
scholarship, it is a little surprising that it does not appear more often 
in the nineteenth century cases. It is perhaps for this reason that the 
Court in Cooper jumped to the conclusion that punitive damages 
compensated pain and suffering in the early cases. Despite the 
availability (as described above) of other rationales for awarding 
punitive damages other than just compensation for mental distress, 
some courts did in fact adopt deterrence as the rationale for punitive 
damages. In Maine, for example, both the majority and the dissent in 
Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway of Canada agreed that the purpose 
156. 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791). 
157. Id. at 78. 
158. See, e.g. , Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 349 (1997). 
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of awarding punitive damages was deterrence. 159 The majority 
thought that this explained why punitive damages should be awarded 
against a railway for the intentional torts of its employee: "[w)hen it is 
thoroughly understood that it is not profitable to employ careless and 
indifferent agents, or reckless and insolent servants, better men will 
take their places, and not before."160 New York held the same view: 
"[i]t is only in cases of moral wrong, recklessness or malice that this 
public consideration applies. In such cases the law uses the suit of a 
private party as an instrument of public protection, not for the sake of 
the suitor but for that of the public. "161 
The New York court's rationale was very far from the view that 
punitive damages were in any way compensatory. It is also very far 
from the view that they were designed to vindicate. It is difficult to 
quantify how many courts and commentators actively adopted the 
deterrence rationale, but it is clear that it was well established by the 
middle of the nineteenth century, and it was quite prevalent by the 
beginning of the twentieth century.162 In any event, its presence in the 
New York, Maine, and Rhode Island decisions indicates that it would 
be a great mistake to suggest that punitive damages were serving a 
primarily compensatory function (of any sort) in the United States in 
the nineteenth century. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article I demonstrated that punitive damages have never 
served the compensatory function attributed to them by the Court in 
Cooper. In footnote eleven of the decision the Court relied on a 
claim about the history of punitive damages that is at best misleading 
and at worst dangerous. While it is true that punitive damages may 
have served a compensatory function in the early cases, it is mislead-
ing to describe that function as directed towards the compensation of 
the sort of emotional distress which is today captured by categories of 
159. 57 Me. 202 (1869). 
160. Id. at 224. The dissent agreed with the goal of general deterrence but disagreed with its 
application in the case of respondeat superior. Id. at 266. The dissent's view is consistent with 
the view of the majority in Hagen v. Providence and Worcester R.R. Co., 3 R.I. 88, 91 (1854), 
which held that, because the purpose of exemplary damages was to "teach the lesson of caution 
to prevent a repetition of criminality," an employer cannot be held liable in punitive damages 
for the actions of a servant. 
161. Hamilton v. Third Avenue R.R. Co., 53 N.Y. 25, 30 (1873). 
162. According to Rustad and Koenig, "[d]uring the initial decades of the twentieth century, 
punitive damages gained an expanded role in consumer protection." Rustad & Koenig, supra 
note 75, at 1303. 
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compensation for mental suffering associated with shock or IIED. If 
punitive damages served a compensatory function, it would have been 
for a category of injury that is still not considered compensable by 
contemporary tort law, namely the injury of insult that wounds or 
dishonors. If these are interests worth protecting-and I believe they 
may be-there is nothing to be gained by promoting the misleading 
idea that they are protected today by contemporary damages for 
emotional distress. Such a claim stretches the doctrine of damages to 
the point of breakage. 
The only reason to ignore the obvious, and to insist on claiming 
that the interest that punitive damages once did and perhaps still 
today compensate is "just like" emotional distress, is to provide a 
historical basis for the claim that the rationale for punitive damages 
has changed in the last 200 years. The Supreme Court's reason for 
wanting to believe that the rationale for punitive damages has 
changed was that it needed to explain what otherwise would be seen 
as a surprising reversal: for over a century courts and commentators 
treated punitive damages as if they were properly a matter of factual 
judgment only. In Cooper the Court seemed to reverse that state of 
affairs and announce that punitive damages require the jury to make 
a moral, not a factual , judgment. 
On the one hand, since I approve of the Court 's procedural con-
clusion-appellate courts should review trial court judgments con-
cerning the constitutionality of juries' punitive damages awards de 
novo-it should not matter how the Court defends its holding. But I 
would like to suggest that the historical argument it used to reach its 
holding is more than misleading, it is dangerous. The implication of 
the historical claim presented in footnote eleven is that there have 
been two distinct periods of punitive damages: the early, in which 
punitive damages served as compensation for emotional distress, and 
the later, in which punitive damages shorn of their old function found 
a new role in American law by becoming a device for punishment. 
It is dangerous for the Court to promote this view not only be-
cause it is false , but because it limits our understanding of what it 
might mean for punitive damages to punish and compensate. As 
demonstrated in the previous sections, punishment and vindication 
were always understood to be two of the primary purposes of punitive 
damages. But it is even more important to recognize that the courts 
and commentators who defended punitive damages in the nineteenth 
century did not see a sharp break between punishment and compen-
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sation in private law. As I suggest above, the "compensation for 
insult" rationale and the "personal vindication" rationale are very 
closely linked. Juries who were asked to award exemplary damages 
in order to vindicate the plaintiff were attempting, in my opinion, to 
give satisfaction to victims in order to help construct their commu-
nity's moral norms. Any analysis that tries to draw sharp distinctions 
between the private and public functions of punitive damages will end 
up mischaracterizing them. 
It is no accident, in my opinion, that the Cooper decision pre-
sents only two choices for how to understand punitive damages. In 
the Court's eyes the phrase punitive damages is a homonym-a 
written expression with two unrelated meanings. On the one hand, to 
say that a jury awarded punitive damages in 1850 is to suggest that it 
awarded compensation for pain and suffering, while on the other 
hand, to say that a jury awarded punitive damages in 1950 is to say 
that it punished the defendant in order to deter future wrongdoing. 
The first use of the term describes a purely factual , backward-looking 
exercise in private redress, while the second describes a purely 
normative, forward-looking exercise in public policy. Not only are 
both caricatures, but the projection of the first as part of a distant past 
legitimates the free use of the second today. Ironically, although the 
Court claimed in Cooper that its discovery that punitive damages are 
today about morality, not compensation, it is most likely that in doing 
so it has promoted a slightly different view. Instead of being about 
compensation and "looking backwards," the Court has reinforced the 
idea that courts and juries should feel free to use punitive damages as 
an instrument of public policy. The public policy that will thus result 
from modern courts will not be concerned primarily with individual 
rights or even punishment for the sake of retribution. The public 
policy guiding the application of punitive damages will be purely 
forward-looking and dominated by the theory of efficient deterrence. 
I view this as a dangerous development, although certainly those who 
think that the only justification for private law is efficiency would 
welcome it. But for those who believe that tort law has some justifi-
cation and point other than to serve the end of promoting welfare, the 
decision in Cooper is a step in the wrong direction. 
